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Malaysia’s economic success is to a significant extent underpinned by its export-oriented 
manufacturing sector. The sector has a large foreign presence, with MNCs attracted by the open trade 
and investment regime, and FDI-friendly policies. Using unpublished manufacturing census data for 
2000 and 2005, we apply the methodology by Foster et al. (1998) to decompose productivity growth. 
The analysis shows that exporters were more productive than domestic-oriented establishments, and 
were distinctly more competitive. The empirical evidence also shows that establishment turnover is 
important in boosting productivity growth. In particular, we find that turnover of exporters made a 
larger contribution to aggregate productivity growth compared to domestic-oriented establishments 
during the period from 2000 to 2005. Surviving establishments (those that operated in both years), on 
the other hand, made a negative contribution. It is noteworthy that entrants to export markets were 
more productive than surviving non-exporters and even surviving exporters. Exiters from export 
markets or “export failures”, on the other hand, were less productive than continuing exporters. Given 
the importance of turnover to productivity growth, the government should ensure unrestricted entry to 
the export sectors for both foreign and domestic investors. Continuing with pro-FDI policies is also 
important, given the keener global competition. 
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After growing at an average rate of 6.5 percent per annum over the period of 1971-2009, the 
Malaysian economy is now at a crossroads.  The country’s economic success was mainly the 
result of its export-oriented development model driven to a significant extent by foreign 
direct investment (FDI).  However, Malaysia is beginning to lose its low-wage advantage, 
which was the main factor behind the large FDI flows that it attracted over the last three 
decades.  Emerging economies in Indo-China, South Asia and reforming East European 
countries are becoming rivals for FDI.  Hence, multinational corporations (MNCs) seeking 
low-cost labour to remain competitive in world markets can consider alternative destinations 
to countries like Malaysia.
4   
A highly interconnected global economy through increased cross-border trade and investment 
flows means that there will be more trading and investment opportunities but also greater 
competition.  In such a fiercely competitive environment, it will not be surprising to see high 
firm turnover (i.e. entry and exit) in export markets.  Turnover could be an important factor 
contributing to higher aggregate productivity in the manufacturing sector, which is why it 
should be analyzed. 
Aggregate productivity in a sector or an industry would increase when establishments benefit 
from economies-of-scale, upgrade their technology, and increase technical efficiency.  
Exporting firms tend to have higher productivity than non-exporters because they are able to 
take advantage of scale economies by producing a large quantity of output for the world 
                                                      
4 The stories of Intel and Dell, MNC success stories of the Malaysian ‘FDI experience’ are telling: the former 
has started operations in Vietnam and the latter in India, taking a part of its Malaysian operations there.  This is 
likely to be a foreshadow of things to come as Malaysia’s comparative advantage changes. 3 
 
market (Chen and Tang, 1990), and may also benefit from “learning-by-exporting” effects
5 
(for examples, see Wagner, 2007; Fryges and Wagner, 2008), which occur because 
productivity increases even further after a firm starts to export.  Furthermore, there is 
considerable empirical evidence
6 on the “self-selection” hypothesis, which asserts that 
relatively more productive firms will have a higher propensity to enter export markets since 
only these highly productive firms could overcome high entry costs of entering international 
markets (Clerides et al., 1998; Bernard et al., 2003; Melitz, 2003).
7 
Aggregate productivity would also increase when resources are reallocated from less 
productive firms to more productive ones.  One way in which this reallocation process works 
is through turnover of firms.  Aggregate productivity would increase if less productive firms 
exit the industry and are replaced by more productive firms.  Reallocation could also affect 
aggregate productivity when more productive firms expand and less productive firms 
contract.  In an open economy, the process of reallocation can be triggered by exporters.  
While entrants to export markets which are more productive survive and expand, less 
productive firms either contract or leave the industry (Greenaway and Kneller, 2007).  For 
                                                      
5 For example, when firms participate in export markets, they can increase productivity through the acquisition 
of product knowledge and technical know-how from their international clients and suppliers.  For empirical 
evidence supporting “learning-by-exporting” effects, see Bigsten et al. (2000) and Baldwin and Gu (2003). 
6 For a survey of previous studies supporting the “self-selection” hypothesis, see Greenaway and Kneller (2005) 
and Wagner (2007).  
7 These high entry costs can be related to the establishment of a new activity or the uncertainty involved in 
exporting or testing new markets (Baldwin 1988).  According to Bernard and Wagner (2001) that the sunk costs 
of export entry could also include locating foreign buyers, and also learning about the market, relevant 
regulations and standards.  In addition, Kim (1997) pointed out that there were other important operational costs 
associated with export activities such as financing, knowledge acquisition and transaction costs in connection 
with linguistic, cultural and legal differences. 4 
 
example, Baldwin and Gu (2003) find that the contribution of export market entry and exit of 
plants to the aggregate productivity growth in Canadian manufacturing in the 1990s was 1.3 
times more than the contribution from continuing plants in export markets. 
This paper analyzes the contribution of surviving establishments and turnover to productivity 
growth in the Malaysian manufacturing sector, with a particular focus on exporters vis-à-vis 
domestic-oriented establishments.  We decompose the aggregate productivity growth over 
2000-2005 to determine if firms entering and exiting the export markets (i.e. turnover) have a 
significant impact on the sector’s productivity growth.  To the best of the authors’ 
knowledge, this is the first such study on the Malaysian manufacturing sector. 
 
The contributions of the present study are threefold.  Firstly, the study provides new 
empirical evidence on Malaysian exporter turnover patterns in the manufacturing sector and 
their impact on the aggregate productivity growth.  Firm-level studies on the patterns of 
productivity growth in the Malaysian manufacturing sector are limited.  One aim of this study 
is to fill this gap.  Secondly, the detailed firm-level study will provide further insights into the 
productivity performance of exporting firms, and this empirical knowledge can shed light on 
the future prospects and challenges of these firms (both new and surviving) in the dynamic 
and competitive global export markets.  Lastly, these findings have useful policy implications 
for the future productivity growth directions of Malaysian manufacturing exporters.  This 
could enable the government to design the appropriate policies to promote productivity 
growth within the sector and, to a larger extent, targeted at exporting firms.  This sort of 
rigorous analysis is important, especially in the present context of the Malaysian economy, 
which is at a turning point.  Policymakers are keen to move the economy up the value chain.  
As the restructuring of the economy unfolds, it is crucial for the authorities to be able to 5 
 
monitor its path.  Feedback based on empirical evidence can then be used to fine-tune 
policies. 
 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows.  Section 2 provides a concise overview of 
industrial development and the manufacturing sector in Malaysia.  Section 3 discusses 
exporters in the Malaysian manufacturing sector and its salient features which have relevance 
to the analysis of turnover patterns.  It also addresses data concerns, use and availability.  
This is followed by an account of how we track continuing exporters (and non-exporters), 
entrants to export markets, exiters from export markets, and calculation of turnover rates for 
exporters and non-exporters.  Section 4 is concerned with the decomposition methods of 
productivity growth used in the study.  The same section also presents and analyzes the key 
findings.  The main conclusions and the policy implications are presented in Section 5. 
 
 
2. Industrial development and the manufacturing sector - an overview 
Since independence in 1957, the structure of the Malaysian economy has evolved from one 
that was reliant on primary commodity exports to one in which manufactured exports are 
pivotal.  The engine of growth also switched from the public to the private sector, following 
the mid-1980s recession. 
Early industrialization strategy was mainly import-substitution while the export sector was 
dominated by the primary commodity sector.  By the late 1960s, the industrialization process 
entered a more outward-looking phase through export-oriented manufacturing.  These 
included labour-intensive activities such as the electronics
8 and textile industries, wood-based 
                                                      
8 Malaysia’s comparative advantage is largely focused on the labour-intensive part of the electronics industry. 6 
 
industries and processing of palm oil and rubber.  The petrochemical industry emerged 
following the discovery of oil. 
The promotion of the manufacturing sector in the country falls under the purview of the 
Malaysian Industrial Development Authority (MIDA), which is under the Ministry of 
International Trade and Industry (MITI).  Industries are actively promoted through fiscal 
incentives in the form of pioneer status, various tax exemptions, duty-free imported inputs, 
investment tax credits, tariff protection and the development of free trade zones.  Incentives 
are also given for research and development (R&D), and training.  Credit is made available 
through the commercial banks and industrial development institutions.  The government also 
actively encourages FDI in the sector.
9 
The government also promoted heavy industries as part of the affirmative action programme 
favouring the Bumiputera
10 group, driven by the New Economic Policy (NEP).  A state-
owned holding company formed partnerships with foreign companies in heavy industries like 
automobiles, iron and steel, petrochemicals, cement and transport equipment.  Although the 
official rhetoric was pitched at emulating the economic success stories of the ‘Asian Tigers’, 
in reality these were inward-looking ventures heavily protected and subsidized by the 
government.  Athukorala and Menon (1999, p. 1130) dubbed such industries under state 
patronage as “born losers” that were “artificially spawned with subsidies”. 
The industrialization effort in Malaysia in the second half of the 1980s was also shaped by 
global developments such as the realignment of exchange rates for the major currencies 
following the Plaza Accord of September 1985.  Less competitive home currencies of some 
                                                      
9 A list of selected incentives is presented in Appendix 1. 
10 Generally refers to the largely Malay ethnic group, although the term also includes minority indigenous 
Orang Asli groups. 7 
 
industrialized countries, together with rising wages, meant that domestic firms sought foreign 
locations for their production.  The South-East Asia region was a beneficiary of this 
development as its abundant low-wage workforce made it a competitive export base for 
foreign firms.  Malaysia rode on this development by adopting FDI-friendly policies.  Fuelled 
by robust FDI inflows, the manufacturing sector's share of GDP rose to 26.9 percent in 1990 
compared with 19.7 percent in 1985. 
To enhance economic competitiveness, in the 1990s, some of the ethnic requirements were 
relaxed with better incentives extended to private sector investors.  Regulations on equity 
participation were relaxed to boost FDI.  This was especially so for the export-oriented 
sectors, where foreigners can own up to 100 percent equity.  To assist in the setting-up of 
foreign firms in the country, administrative measures were eased and speeded up.  Thus, the 
1990s saw further expansion of the export-oriented manufacturing sector, driven by foreign 
investment.  Malaysia became one of the world’s top exporters of electronics and electrical 
appliances.  Although the East Asian currency crisis of 1997-98 disrupted growth, the 
economy has since recovered and resumed a more sustainable growth path. 
Hence, economic policy in Malaysia has long emphasized export-led growth through private 
sector participation and attracting FDI.  The export-oriented sectors were able to procure 
imported inputs at world prices so as not to jeopardize their global competitiveness.  This 
policy stance of promoting export-led manufacturing has always been preserved by the 
government.  As pointed out by Athukorala and Menon (1999), the protection (and 
patronage) given to politically sensitive ventures in domestic-oriented heavy industries
11 did 
not compromise the development of the export sectors in manufacturing. 
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Over time, the protection given to the manufacturing sector from foreign competition has also 
declined.  Alavi (1996) pointed out that the average effective rate of manufacturing protection 
declined from 70 percent in the early 1970s to less than 30 percent by the late 1980s.  
Athukorala and Menon (1999) noted that by the mid-1990s, the import-value weighted 
average nominal tariff was as low as 15 percent.  Alavi (1996) also showed that the best 
performing firms in TFP growth over the period 1979-89 were in labour-intensive industries 
dominated by the private sector, which received little or no direct government assistance.  
Some of these industries are export-oriented ones like textiles and apparel, and footwear. 
The importance of manufactured exports can be seen in its rising share of Malaysia’s total 
exports over the years.  The composition of Malaysia’s manufactured exports has evolved 
over the years.  In the 1970s and early 1980s, the manufactured exports were mainly 
resource-based (e.g. food and beverages, wood products, tobacco etc.).  In the second half of 
the 1980s, there was a distinct shift towards exports of electronics, electrical machinery and 
appliances.  Exports of electronics and electrical goods (or “E&E”) made up 72.5 percent of 
total manufactured exports in 2000. 
The changing composition of manufactured exports is linked to the strong foreign presence in 
the sector.  Using Malaysia as a production base for manufactured exports, foreign MNCs 
had shaped the sector into a more export-oriented one.  Athukorala and Menon (1999) noted 
that FDI had increased about ten-fold between 1987 and 1991, and Malaysia had 
outperformed its ASEAN neighbours as a host country.
12  The FDI inflows were mostly 
concentrated in the electronics, electrical appliances, and consumer goods sectors.  Reflecting 
the importance of foreign firms in the export-oriented sectors, Athukorala and Menon (1999) 
                                                      
12 ASEAN is the acronym for the Association of South-East Asian Nations, then comprising Malaysia, 
Singapore, Thailand, Indonesia, Philippines and Brunei. 9 
 
observed the high positive correlation of foreign presence and the sector’s contribution to 
total manufactured exports. 
In summary, the manufacturing sector played a vital role in industrializing the economy 
owing to the adoption of an export-oriented industrialization strategy over the past four 
decades (see Ariff, 1994).  As a result, manufactured goods make up a significant share of the 
country’s total exports (2009: 77.8%).  Table 1 provides some useful indicators on the 
manufacturing sector in Malaysia for selected years. 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
 
3. Exporters in Malaysian manufacturing 
We use unpublished data from the 2000 and 2005 Census of Manufacturing obtained from 
the Department of Statistics, Malaysia.  The census covered all manufacturing establishments 
registered with the Companies Commission of Malaysia.  The census frame also used 
information from other sources, such as trade associations, federal and state development 
authorities, and is updated annually.  An establishment is a single unit which could be part of 
a multi-establishment firm (each unit of a multi-establishment firm operating at a different 
location has to submit a different census form).  The sample size for the year 2000 was 
20,080, while that for 2005 was 28,094.
13 
Exporters in the manufacturing sector of Malaysia numbered 3,294 in 2000 and 2,915 in 2005 
(see Table 2), representing 16.4 percent and 10.4 percent of all establishments in the two 
respective years.  Thus, Malaysian manufacturing had shed 11.5 percent of its exporters over 
                                                      
13 We deleted 374 establishments from the dataset because their value-added in 2000 was either negative or 
zero.  Two establishments with extremely high productivities were also deleted since, as outliers, they may bias 
the results. 10 
 
the period.  While 567 establishments switched from solely producing for domestic markets 
to producing for export markets as well by 2005, there were 1,127 exporters that did the 
opposite (that is, they exited export markets and produced for the domestic markets).  
Meanwhile, 932 of 16,400 new establishments and 751 of 8,386 establishments that exited 
the manufacturing sector in 2005 were exporters.  Therefore, the decline in the number of 
exporters was largely due to the net change in the number of switchers, which are those 
establishments that operated in both years but switched out of or into exporting. 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
We track survival, entry, and exit by tracing the appearance or disappearance of the unique 
identification number assigned to each establishment.
14  Establishments whose identification 
numbers appeared in both 2000 and 2005 are survivors, exiters are the establishments whose 
identification numbers appeared in 2000 but disappeared in 2005, and entrants are the 
establishments whose identification number did not appear in 2000 but appeared in 2005.  
We further categorize survivors into four groups: establishments that exported in both 2000 
and 2005 are called ‘continuing exporters’, and those that did not export in either year are 
called ‘continuing non-exporters’.  The remaining two groups consist of establishments that 
switched from non-exporting to exporting (‘entrants to export markets’), and establishments 
that did the opposite (‘exiters from export markets’). 
Entry and exit rates for exporters, non-exporters, and all manufacturing establishments are 
calculated by dividing the number of entrants and exiters by the total number of exporters, 
non-exporters, and manufacturing establishments in 2000 respectively.  Turnover rate is the 
sum of entry and exit rates, and are shown in the bottom panel of Table 2, together with entry 
                                                      
14 We cannot identify the establishments that were sold or reorganized, or changed their names, and were given 
a different identification number.  Hence, entry and exit rates will be affected to the extent this is true. 11 
 
and exit rates.  Out of 20,080 establishments that were in business in the beginning of the 
period, 8,386 establishments exited.  This yields a 42 percent exit rate.  Entry rate for all 
establishments is 82 percent (16,400 establishments), giving rise to an overall turnover rate of 
124 percent.  Turnover rate of exporters is 102 percent while that of non-exporters is 147 
percent. 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
Table 3 shows the shares of survivors and entrants for various indicators: number of 
establishments, employment, wages, value added, gross output, number of exporters and 
export value.  Survivors are broken down into the four groups mentioned earlier.  Exiters (in 
2000) and entrants (in 2005) are classified under two groups - exporters and non-exporters.  
From the table, it is clear that the shares of employment, wages, value-added, and gross 
output accounted for by exporters were significantly higher than that of non-exporters.  This 
is in sharp contrast to the fact that there were far less number of exporting establishments 
than non-exporting ones.  For example, while exporters made up 16.40 percent of all 
establishments in 2000, their share of value-added and employment were 62.50 percent and 
57.68 percent respectively.
15  This indicates that many exporting establishments were large 
since they generated most of the employment and value-added despite their small numbers. 
The data presented in Table 3 also provide some perspective on the effect of turnover on the 
manufacturing sector.  In 2000, the percentage of establishments that exited the 
manufacturing sector was 41.76 percent; in 2005, entrants made up 58.38 percent of total 
establishments.  A very high percentage of both exiters and entrants were non-exporters, 
reflecting the overall structure of establishments in this aspect.  Entrants,
16 as a group, made 
                                                      
15 This same trend was observed for 2005 data. 
16 Refer to row labelled “all entrants” in Table 3. 12 
 
higher contributions to employment, wages, value-added and gross output than exiters
17 did.  
Although the percentage of entrants which exported (31.97%) was noticeably higher than that 
of exiters which exported (22.80%), the former’s share in value of exports (15.28%) was 
marginally lower than that of the latter’s (15.38%). 
Table 4 shows the contribution of survivors and turnover (entrants and exiters) to growth of 
employment, wages, value-added and gross output over the two years, 2000 and 2005.  The 
data are also categorized by exporters and non-exporters.  While non-exporters recorded 
positive and significant contributions in all categories, exporters made negative contributions 
to employment, wages, value-added, and a positive though small contribution to gross output 
growth.  To illustrate, exporters accounted for -3.08 percent, and non-exporters for 13.04 
percent of the 9.96 percent growth in value-added over the period.  At this point, we recall 
that the number of exporters had declined by 11.5 percent over the period,
 18 and this could 
have an impact on some of the observations noted here.
 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
The relative impact of turnover is also captured by data presented in Table 4.  Compared to 
survivors, turnover made a higher contribution to the growth in employment and especially 
value-added, but lower contribution to the growth in wages, gross output, and value of 
exports (see rows marked 1 and 2 in Table 4).  Turnover of exporters made large but negative 
contributions to the growth in all variables (row-6 in Table 4), with most of the negative 
growth in each variable accounted for by the turnover of switchers (row-4).  In contrast, 
continuing exporters made positive although small contributions to growth, except for gross 
output. 
                                                      
17 Refer to row labelled “all exiters” in Table 3. 
18 As noted in the discussion on Table 2. 13 
 
Turning our attention to non-exporters, it is observed that turnover (row-11 in Table 4) made 
a significantly larger positive contribution to growth than continuous non-exporters (row-8).  
However, in this case, the entry and exit of non-exporters (row-10) made a noticeably larger 
impact than switchers out of export markets (row-9) in all variables except for value-added. 
Table 5 presents various characteristics of different groups of establishments.  Productivity is 
calculated as (real) value-added per worker.  Real value-added is obtained by deflating with 
the Producer Price Index for the whole manufacturing sector.  The number of workers 
engaged is the total on payroll in December or the last pay period of the reference year.  
Compared to non-exporters, exporters had a larger mean size (as measured by number of 
workers) and generated higher mean value-added and mean gross output.  They also showed 
higher productivity and gross output per worker.  Exporters also paid higher wages, as one 
would expect given their higher productivity. 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
We present the average productivities of ‘continuing exporters’, ‘exiters from export 
markets’, ‘entrants to export markets’, and ‘continuing non-exporters’ in Table 6.  For both 
the reference years 2000 and 2005, ‘entrants to export markets’ were the most productive 
while ‘continuing non-exporters’ were the least.  In fact, it is clear from the data that the 
export-oriented establishments were distinctly more productive than domestic-oriented ones.  
Even the ‘exiters from export markets’ were more productive than ‘continuing non-
exporters’.  However, these ‘exiters’ were evidently less productive than ‘continuing 
exporters’, indicating that weak exporters eventually dropped out of global markets.  The 
average productivity level of these “export failures” was almost as low as that of 
establishments that continued serving the domestic markets throughout.  It is also of interest 14 
 
to note that the average productivity of ‘entrants to export markets’ was higher than that for 
‘continuing exporters’.   
In terms of productivity growth, a different trend emerged between exporters and non-
exporters.  While the productivity of ‘continuing non-exporters’ showed growth (5.79%), that 
of all other groups registered declines.  Among these three groups, the productivity of 
‘entrants to export markets’ declined the most (-10.95%) over the two reference years, 
followed by ‘continuing exporters’ (-4.90%) and ‘exiters from export markets’ (-1.32%). 
 [Insert Table 6 here] 
The results from the productivity data in levels may favour the “self-selection” hypothesis as 
establishments with superior productivity enter the export markets and survive while laggards 
unable to compete leave the global markets.  However, it is noted that the productivity 
growth of ‘continuing exporters’ was better than that of ‘entrants to export markets’, which 
indicates support for the “learning-by-exporting” argument. 
The data on productivity growth appear counter-intuitive to expectations that exporters 
(operating in the fiercely competitive global environment) would likely outperform domestic-
oriented establishments.  At this juncture, it is pertinent to note developments in the 
manufacturing sector over the period that may shed light on the present analysis.  The 
manufacturing sector (in tandem with the economy) recovered strongly from the East Asian 
currency crisis of 1997-98 in 1999 and 2000.  However, in 2001, the significant global 
economic slowdown, especially in the United States and Japan, caused the Malaysian 
manufacturing sector to contract by about six percent as demand for electronic products 
slumped.  Although the sector resumed growth in 2002, its growth rate was at a more 
moderate pace.  In 2005, the manufacturing sector grew by a modest 4.9 percent.  Of 
significance was the sharply lower output growth of 3.5 percent in the E&E products industry 15 
 
that year (2004: 19.3%).  This was on account of the global semiconductor down-cycle in the 
first half of 2005, resulting in oversupply.  The weak construction sector had also affected 
related manufacturing industries.  Value-added of the manufacturing sector could have been 
affected as depressed demand conditions may mean more competitive pricing, resulting in 
lower margins.  It is plausible that the productivity numbers for 2005 could have been 
influenced by this as the sector continued to recover.  This may help explain the negative 
productivity growth rate for the export-oriented establishments over the two reference years.  
Notwithstanding this, it is stressed that the absolute (average) productivity numbers showed 
that exporters were significantly more productive than the domestic-oriented establishments.  
This is a valid observation for both the census years. 
4. Productivity decompositions 




where   is the share of establishment i in aggregate employment in year t ( ) and 
pit is the labour productivity of establishment i in year t.  We use labour productivity (value-
added over employment) instead of a measure of total factor productivity to avoid the 
problems that would arise from using the book value of assets as a proxy for capital, which 
would be needed in the calculations.
19  Using employment shares rather than market shares as 
weights for labour productivity is more common (Ahn, 2001), and also more intuitive (Van 
                                                      
19  There are doubts as to the accuracy of the fixed assets data for establishments reporting very low values, e.g. 
RM1. 16 
 
Biesebroeck, 2005) since the sum of weighted labour productivities over all establishments 
would add up to the aggregate productivity. 
Our main method of decomposition is the Foster, Haltiwanger and Krizan (1998) (henceforth 




where S, N, and X denote survivors, entrants, and exiters respectively.    is the aggregate 
(weighted average) productivity in year t-k, which is the year 2000 in our case.  The symbol 
Δ indicates the change in a variable across the two years. 
The first term in equation (2), the ‘within effect’, represents the contribution of survivors to 
productivity growth due to increasing or decreasing establishment productivity, holding base 
year employment shares constant.  The second term, the ‘between effect’, reflects the 
contribution of survivors with above or below average productivity to productivity growth 
through their expansion or downsizing.  The ‘cross effect’, which is the third term, represents 
the contribution of survivors with increasing or decreasing productivities to productivity 
growth through their upsizing or downsizing.  The sum of the last two terms, the ‘entry’ and 
‘exit’ effects, is the contribution of turnover to productivity growth.  It is also known as the 
‘net entry effect’.  Note that the ‘exit effect’ is negative if exiting establishments have lower 
productivity.  Hence, the negative sign preceding the term allows for a positive impact on 
aggregate productivity. 
For sensitivity analysis, we use a second method by Griliches and Regev (1995) (hereafter 
GR), which differs from the FHK method in that it replaces the initial (base year) values of 17 
 
employment shares, plant and aggregate productivities with the time averages of these 
variables.  This replacement yields: 
 
 
All variables are defined as before, and a bar over a variable denotes a time average.  Due to 
time averaging, there is no ‘cross’ term in the GR method.  An advantage of the GR method 
over the FHK method is that, by using time averages, the effect of random measurement 
errors is reduced (Foster et al. 1998).  However, interpreting the ‘within’ and ‘between’ terms 
is difficult with the GR method, since by including the time average of shares in the former 
and the time average of productivities in the latter, we would no longer be holding these two 
variables fixed at their initial values (Foster et al. 1998). 
The decomposition results are presented in Table 7, with the effects of survivors broken into 
four categories: ‘continuing exporters’, ‘exiters from export markets’, ‘entrants to export 
markets’, and ‘continuing non-exporters’.  The results from the FHK decomposition show 
that the aggregate productivity of manufacturing establishments increased over the sample 
period by 2.38 percent, which was due to the positive contribution of turnover (4.38%) 
outweighing the negative contribution of survivors (-2.00%).  Results from the GR method 
are consistent, with a higher contribution of turnover (4.35%) and lower but still negative 
contribution of survivors (-1.97%).  These results clearly show that without entry and exit, 
which generate the ‘net entry’ or turnover effect, aggregate productivity growth would have 
been much lower because of the negative contribution of survivors. 
Closer inspection of the decomposition results reveals that establishments that served 
domestic markets throughout (‘continuing non-exporters’) made the most significant 18 
 
contribution to productivity growth (1.20%).  In contrast, most of the negative contribution 
made by survivors were accounted for by ‘continuing exporters’ (-1.92%), followed by that 
of ‘entrants to export markets’ (-1.16%).  The GR method yielded results that are consistent 
in terms of signs and relative contribution of the various establishment categories. 
[Insert Table 7 here] 
The FHK decomposition results indicate that the 4.38 percent contribution of turnover to 
aggregate productivity growth (positive ‘net entry’ component) was largely due to a 
significant ‘exit effect’ contributing 6.61 percent to growth
20, which together with an ‘entry 
effect’ of -2.23 percent, produces the ‘net entry’ effect.  This means that establishments 
making a lower contribution to aggregate productivity growth (exiters) were replaced by 
establishments making a higher contribution to it (entrants).  We note that turnover of 
exporters (3.79%) made a significantly larger contribution to aggregate productivity than the 
turnover of non-exporters (0.59%).  The positive impact of “churning” on productivity 
growth in the export sector can be broken down to new establishments making a positive 
contribution of 1.40 percent while exiting failed exporters accounted for 2.39 percent of 
growth.
21  In other words, the productivity increase for exporters was due to lower 
productivity establishments exiting and the positive impact of entrants to the industry, rather 
than from internal improvements. 
                                                      
20 The computed figure is actually -6.61 percent as the exiters have lower productivity.  However, as in equation 
(2), the ‘exit effect’ term is preceded by a negative sign to allow for a positive impact in such situations.  This 
means that if exiting firms were less productive, it boosts aggregate productivity while if they had higher 
productivity, their departure will obviously reduce aggregate productivity.  In our case, it is more intuitive to 
present the 6.61 percent as positive to show that it boosted aggregate productivity. 
21 The -2.39 percent contribution is presented here as positive for clearer interpretation.  See preceding footnote. 19 
 
The results of further decomposition of survivors’ contribution are presented in Table 8.  
Survivors’ overall -2.00 percent contribution to aggregate productivity growth was due to the 
large negative ‘cross effect’ (-5.96%) together with a smaller negative ‘within effect’ (-
1.40%) outweighing the positive contribution of the ‘between effect’ (5.37%). 
The ‘within effect’ shows the contribution to sector productivity growth from increasing or 
declining establishment productivity.  It is noteworthy that ‘continuing non-exporters’ was 
the only category to record a positive contribution (1.04%) while ‘entrants to export markets’ 
had a large negative value (-1.68%).  The contribution of ‘exiters from export markets’ (-
0.24%) was higher than that of ‘continuing exporters’ (-0.53%).
22  This is consistent with the 
average productivity growth analyzed earlier.  Hence, among the establishments that 
remained in operation throughout the period, only the domestic-oriented ones showed internal 
improvement. 
The ‘between effect’ shows the impact of redistribution of resources across establishments 
that remained open throughout the period.  A positive ‘between effect’ was obtained for all 
four categories of establishments.  This indicates the dominance of survivors with above 
average productivities increasing their employment shares, and survivors with below average 
productivities with declining employment shares.  The positive ‘between effect’ shows that 
labour has been allocated efficiently.  That is, the more productive establishments had 
increased their labour share while less productive ones had lost their share over this period.  
This was more pronounced among the ‘continuing non-exporters’ (1.90%) and least among 
the ‘entrants to export markets’ (1.06%). 
The ‘cross effect’ term shows whether productivity improvement corresponds with increasing 
labour share.  The negative sign obtained is due to the declining employment shares of 
                                                      
22 In the sense that the former group had a smaller negative value compared with the latter group. 20 
 
survivors whose productivity improved, and to the increasing employment shares of survivors 
whose productivity worsened.  All four categories of establishments showed negative values, 
with ‘continuing exporters’ (-2.59%) and ‘continuing non-exporters’ (-1.75%) being the two 
largest. 
[Insert Table 8 here] 
5. Conclusions 
 
Exporters make a very significant contribution to the Malaysian manufacturing sector.  They 
generate most of the employment and value-added in the sector although their numbers are 
small compared with domestic-oriented firms.  Exporters are larger establishments compared 
with domestic-oriented ones; they produce higher mean value-added, are more productive, 
and pay higher wages.  Significant resources have been channelled by the government in 
promoting export-oriented manufacturing activities, including incentives to attract foreign 
direct investment.  Given the significance of exporters to the sector, it is important to 
critically evaluate their contribution as it would assist the government in policymaking. 
The productivity analysis shows that exporters were more productive than domestic-oriented 
establishments, indicating that exporters were distinctly more competitive during the period 
of analysis.  This reaffirms the government’s longstanding policy of promoting an open trade 
and investment policy to boost economic growth through export activities.  At a more 
detailed level, several interesting observations were revealed by the study.  Entrants to export 
markets were more productive than both the surviving domestic-oriented establishments 
(non-exporters) and, even more telling, surviving exporters.  On the other hand, exiters from 
the export markets or “export failures” were less productive than continuing exporters. 21 
 
The productivity decomposition shows that without turnover (entry of new establishments 
and exit of failed ones), sectoral growth would have been adversely affected, since surviving 
establishments made a negative contribution.  Entrants to the sector made a higher 
contribution to productivity growth compared with exiters.  In particular, turnover of 
exporters made a significantly larger contribution than turnover of domestic-oriented 
establishments.  This shows the importance of the “churning” process to maintain 
competitiveness in the export sectors. 
However, the decomposition shows that among surviving establishments, only continuing 
non-exporters had a positive impact on sector productivity due to within-firm productivity 
improvements and positive reallocation effects.  On the other hand, continuing exporters and 
entrants to export markets contributed negatively.  Nevertheless, inter-firm reallocations of 
labour (between effects) were efficient for all establishment categories, with those above 
average productivity gaining labour share overall.  This was most evident among the 
domestic-oriented establishments that remained in operation throughout the period.  Hence, 
the empirical evidence shows that reallocation is a powerful channel in keeping the 
manufacturing sector competitive. 
The positive impact of establishment turnover on productivity growth, especially for the 
export sector, has several policy implications.  For example, it makes a strong case that the 
government should ensure that there is unrestricted entry in export sectors that it wants to 
promote as global beaters, and this should be extended to both foreign and domestic 
investors. In view of the importance of FDI in the export-oriented industries, policies should 
continue to attract foreign investors and enhance the country’s attraction as an FDI 22 
 
destination.
23  Hence, the policy of openness that was so successful hitherto has to be 
continued and perhaps even stepped up, in view of the more competitive global environment.  
Similarly, the government should also not intervene to protect ailing industries where 
Malaysia does not have any meaningful comparative advantage through protection and/or 
subsidies.  The ‘dualism’ that Athukorala and Menon (1999) alluded to in Malaysian industry 
– having highly protected (politically connected) inward-looking sectors, and open, globally 
competitive export-oriented sectors – should be eliminated to bring the economy to a higher 
competitive level. 
The New Economic Model (NEM) unveiled in March 2010 by Prime Minister Najib seeks to 
transform the Malaysian economy to a high value one and realize the nation’s aspirations to 
attain developed nation status by 2020.
24  However, Malaysia is a small economy and there is 
a limit to which its domestic market can be counted on to support brisk economic growth.  
Hence, the country cannot afford not to embrace the global markets for growth.  It is evident 
from our analysis that export-oriented establishments are more productive than domestic-
oriented ones.  About one-third of these exporters are foreign-owned.  An open trade and 
investment policy that is foreign investor-friendly is the only realistic option for the country 
to enjoy continued economic prosperity.  This has been applied very successfully to the 
export-oriented manufacturing sectors.  Perhaps it’s timely for the government to consider a 
similar policy stance for other industries within the manufacturing sector that have been 
enjoying political patronage and hence not subjected to the demanding realities of global 
competitive forces.  Taking a broader outlook and in view of the need to seek new growth 
                                                      
23 Malaysia has to develop its “advanced factors” as Porter (1998) calls it, especially highly skilled human 
resource, and a strong technology and knowledge base, so as to attract higher value FDI. 
24 See ‘Office of the Prime Minister of Malaysia’ website (www.pmo.gov.my) for details on the New Economic 
Model. 23 
 
areas, the same can be said for the services sector, which made up 49.7 percent of real GDP 
in 2009 (excluding government services) but is largely inward-looking and protected. 
Lastly, the empirical work also showed that among survivors, non-exporters made the most 
significant contribution to productivity growth, albeit their productivity lags behind that of 
exporters.  Such evidence of intra-firm improvements would at least lend support to 
government policies in assisting these sectors but not through protection and subsidies, which 
tend to attract and entrench vested interests.  Instead, the government can help through 
meaningful assistance like start-up capital, financial aid for research and development, 
technical expertise, improving marketing etc.  Developing robust domestic industries will 
diversify the growth base and reduce imbalances.  In the longer term, these firms may well 
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Table 1: Malaysia's manufacturing sector - various indicators
   2000 2005 2009 
Manufacturing value added (% of GDP)  30.9 30.7 26.9 
Export-oriented manufacturing: weight in IIP  0.80 0.80 n.a. 
Manufactured exports (% of total exports)  85.2 80.7 77.8 
Electronics & electrical exports (% of manuf. exports) 72.5 65.4 57.4 
Source: Calculated from data obtained from Bank Negara Malaysia publications. 




Table 2: Number of manufacturing exporters and non-exporters in 2000 and 2005 
                Number of establishments 
Status in 2005 
Status in 2000  Exporters Non-exporters Sum Exiters  All in 2000
Exporters 1,416
a 1,127
b 2,543 751 3,294
Non-exporters 567
c 8,584
d 9,151 7,635 16,786
Sum 1,983 9,711 11,694 8,386  20,080
Entrants 932 15,468 16,400
All in 2005  2,915 25,179 28,094
Turnover rates (%) 
Exporters Non-exporters Sector




Entry rate (NR)  45 99 82




Exit rate (XR)  57 48 42
Turnover rate (NR+XR)  102 147 124      
Source: Calculated by using the data obtained from the Department of Statistics, Malaysia. 
Notes: 
aContinuing exporters;
 bexiters from export markets; 
centrants to export markets;
 dcontinuing non-





Table 3: Categories of manufacturing establishments - share in various variables (%)
  
Number of 










Continuing exporters (1) 7.05 30.30 32.73  38.74 38.40 42.99 55.46 
Exiters from export markets (2) 5.61 17.92 18.80  16.69 20.98 34.21 29.16 
Entrants to export markets (3) 2.82 6.99 7.19  10.86 7.93 0.00 0.00 
Continuing non-exporters (4) 42.75 22.77 21.24  18.30 14.63 0.00 0.00 
All survivors (1+2+3+4) 58.24 77.98 79.96  84.59 81.94 77.20 84.62 
Exiting exporters (5) 3.74 9.46 8.98  7.07 10.77 22.80 15.38 
Exiting non-exporters (6) 38.02 12.56 11.06  8.34 7.29 0.00 0.00 
All exiters (5+6) 41.76 22.02 20.04  15.41 18.06 22.80 15.38 
All exporters (1+2+5) 16.40 57.68 60.51  62.50 70.15 100.00 100.00 
All non-exporters (3+4+6) 83.60 42.32 39.49  37.50 29.85 0.00 0.00 
in 2005 
Continuing exporters (1) 5.04 30.20 32.74  35.88 41.02 48.58 72.34 
Exiters from export markets (2) 4.01 16.59 17.61  14.89 16.50 0.00 0.00 
Entrants to export markets (3) 2.02 7.06 7.14  9.54 7.67 19.45 12.38 
Continuing non-exporters (4) 30.55 21.86 21.12  18.15 14.27 0.00 0.00 
All survivors (1+2+3+4) 41.62 75.71 78.61  78.46 79.47 68.03 84.72 
Entering exporters (5) 3.32 7.42 7.43  8.61 8.96 31.97 15.28 
Entering non-exporters (6) 55.06 16.87 13.96  12.93 11.58 0.00 0.00 
All entrants (5+6) 58.38 24.29 21.39  21.54 20.53 31.97 15.28 
All exporters (1+3+5) 10.38 44.68 47.31  54.03 57.65 100.00 100.00 
All non-exporters (2+4+6) 89.62 55.32 52.69  45.97 42.35 0.00 0.00 
Source: Calculated by using the data obtained from the Department of Statistics, Malaysia. 
Note: Survivors are establishments that operated in both years. 30 
 
Table 4: Contributions to growth in total employment, wages, value added, gross output, 
and value of exports (% growth rate, 2000-2005) 








Survivors (1) 3.34 9.10 1.68  20.43  5.16
Turnover (2) 4.06 4.19 8.28  8.39  0.81
Continuous exporters (3) 2.15 4.36 0.71  14.45  21.19
Switchers into export markets
a (4) -10.34 -10.71 -6.19  -11.10  -16.03
Entry and exit of exporters (5) -1.50 -0.56 2.40  0.76  0.81
Turnover of exporters (6=4+5) -11.83 -11.27 -3.80  -10.34  -15.22
Exporters (7=3+6) -9.69 -6.91 -3.08  4.12  5.97
Continuous non-exporters (8) 0.70 2.69 1.66  3.75  0.00
Switchers out of export markets
b (9) 5.56 4.75 5.88  7.63  0.00
Entry and exit of non-exporters (10) 10.82 12.76 5.51  13.33  0.00
Turnover of non-exporters (11=9+10) 16.39 17.51 11.39  20.95  0.00
Non-exporters (12=8+11) 17.09 20.20 13.04  24.70  0.00
Growth (1+2 or 7+12) 7.40 13.29 9.96  28.82  5.97
Source: Calculated by using the data obtained from the Department of Statistics Malaysia. 
Notes: 
aDifference between values in 2005 (of the entrants to export markets) and 2000 (of the exiters from 
exports markets) ;
 bdifference between values in 2005 (of the exiters from export markets) and 2000 (of the 
entrants to exports markets). 
Each entry is calculated as change over the total value in 2000 (e.g. survivors contribution of 3.34% to 
employment is change in survivors' employment divided by the total employment in 2000). 
Survivors are establishments that operated in both years. 31 
 
















Continuing  exporters  1,416  240,917  330  999,470 729.5 3,026 158.9 77.62 
Exiters  from  export  markets  1,127  130,380  245  673,087 531.2 2,742 148.1 72.19 
Entrants to export markets  567  168,688  190  518,294  886.4  2,723  144.7  0.00 
Continuing  non-exporters  8,584  18,768  41  60,420 458.4 1,476 132.5  0.00 
All  surviving  exporters  2,543  191,929  293  854,824 655.8 2,921 154.9 75.72 
All  surviving  non-exporters  9,151  28,057  50  88,790 558.9 1,769 135.4  0.00 
All  survivors  11,694  63,693  103  255,373 618.8 2,481 147.5 55.12 
Exiting  exporters  751  82,888  195  557,519 426.1 2,866 147.5 77.14 
Exiting  non-exporters  7,635  9,619  25  36,224 378.9 1,427 125.5  0.00 
All  exiters  8,386  16,181  41  82,908 399.2 2,046 135.0 46.45 
All  exporters  3,294  167,069  270  787,042 618.1 2,912 153.7 75.95 
All  non-exporters  16,786  19,671  39  64,881 505.5 1,667 132.5  0.00 
All  in  2000  20,080  43,850  77  183,347 570.5 2,385 144.7 53.48 
in 2005 
Continuing  exporters  1,416  245,338  354  1,407,243 693.8 3,979 174.4 80.87 
Exiters  from  export  markets  1,127  127,896  244  732,639 524.2 3,003 170.7  0.00 
Entrants  to  export  markets  567  162,967  206  587,774 789.3 2,847 156.0 70.73 
Continuing  non-exporters  8,584  20,468  42  72,197 484.9 1,710 143.2  0.00 
All  surviving  exporters  1,983  221,785  312  1,172,932 711.9 3,765 170.9 79.41 
All  surviving  non-exporters  9,711  32,936  66  148,844 501.9 2,268 155.1  0.00 
All  survivors  11,694  64,960  107  322,503 605.2 3,005 162.9 48.98 
Entering  exporters  932  89,443  132  407,500 677.9 3,089 156.9 80.06 
Entering  non-exporters  15,468  8,094  18  33,777 447.7 1,868 126.1  0.00 
All  entrants  16,400  12,717  25  55,015 518.0 2,241 135.5 33.70 
All  exporters  2,915  179,472  254  928,204 706.2 3,653 168.6 79.50 
All  non-exporters  25,179  17,675  36  78,156 485.3 2,146 146.2  0.00 
All  in  2005  28,094  34,463  59  166,356 584.1 2,819 156.2 46.03 
Source: Calculated by using the data obtained from the Department of Statistics, Malaysia. 
Note: Productivity is calculated as value added over employment; export intensity is defined as value of exports over gross output; survivors are establishments that 
operated in both years. 32 
 







a % of productivity in 2000  Growth 
rate
b





Continuing exporters  729.52 693.76 100.00  95.10 -4.90
Exiters from export markets  531.17 524.16 72.81  71.85 -1.32
Entrants to export markets  886.36 789.30 121.50  108.19 -10.95
Continuing non-exporters  458.40 484.93 62.84  66.47 5.79
Source: Calculated by using the data obtained from the Department of Statistics, Malaysia. 
Notes: 
aTotal group value added over total group employment; 
bdifference in end and beginning period values as a 
percentage of the beginning period value; survivors are establishments that operated in both years. 
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Table 7: Decomposition of productivity growth, 2000-2005 
  
Contribution to aggregate 
productivity growth
As a percentage of total 
growth rate of 2.38%
FHK GR FHK GR
Survivors 
Continuing exporters  -1.92 -1.92 -80.52  -80.48
Exiters from export markets  -0.11 -0.10 -4.71  -4.04
Entrants to export markets  -1.16 -1.16 -48.79  -48.83
Continuing non-exporters  1.20 1.21 50.21  50.66
All survivors (1) -2.00 -1.97 -83.81  -82.68
Entrants (new establishments) 
Exporters 1.40 1.31 58.67  54.96
Non-exporters -3.63 -3.83 -152.37  -160.81
All entrants (2) -2.23 -2.52 -93.71  -105.85
Exiters (failed establishments) 
Exporters -2.39 -2.51 -100.51  -105.24
Non-exporters -4.22 -4.37 -177.01  -183.29
All exiters (3) -6.61 -6.87 -277.52  -288.53
Net entry 
Exporters 3.79 3.82 159.18  160.20
Non-exporters 0.59 0.54 24.64  22.48
Total net entry (4)  4.38 4.35 183.81  182.68
All (1+4) 2.38 2.38 100.00  100.00
Source: Authors' calculations. 




Table 8: Contribution of survivors to aggregate productivity growth, 2000-2005 
   Within Between Cross  Total 
FHK 
Continuing exporters  -0.53 1.20 -2.59  -1.92 
Exiters from export markets  -0.24 1.20 -1.08  -0.11 
Entrants to export markets  -1.68 1.06 -0.55  -1.16 
Continuing non-exporters  1.04 1.90 -1.75  1.20 
All -1.40 5.37 -5.96  -2.00 
as a percentage of total growth rate of 2.38% 
Continuing exporters  -22.1 50.3 -108.8  -80.6 
Exiters from export markets  -10.1 50.6 -45.2  -4.7 
Entrants to export markets  -70.4 44.7 -23.1  -48.8 
Continuing non-exporters  43.9 79.9 -73.5  50.3 
All -58.7 225.5 -250.6  -83.9 
GR 
Continuing exporters  -1.82 -0.10 -1.92 
Exiters from export markets  -0.78 0.68 -0.10 
Entrants to export markets  -1.95 0.79 -1.16 
Continuing non-exporters  0.17 1.04 1.21 
All -4.38 2.41 -1.97 
as a percentage of total growth rate of 2.38% 
Continuing exporters  -76.5 -4.1 0.0  -80.6 
Exiters from export markets  -32.7 28.6 0.0  -4.0 
Entrants to export markets  -82.0 33.1 0.0  -48.9 
Continuing non-exporters  7.1 43.6 0.0  50.7 
All -184.0 101.3 0.0  -82.8 
Source: Authors' calculations. 




Appendix 1 – Selected Incentives for the Manufacturing Sector and Related Incentives 
(From information obtained at the website of the Malaysian Industrial Development Authority - 
www.mida.gov.my) 
 
Incentives for Investments 
  Main Incentives for Manufacturing Companies 
o  Pioneer Status  
o  Investment Tax Allowance  
  Incentives for Relocating Manufacturing Activities to Promoted Areas 
  Incentives for High Technology Companies 
  Incentives for Strategic Projects 
  Incentives for Small and Medium-Scale Companies 
  Incentives to Strengthen Industrial Linkages 
  Incentives for the Machinery and Equipment Industry 
  Incentives for the Production of Specialized Machinery and Equipment 
  Incentives for Automotive Component Modules 
 
Additional Incentives for the Manufacturing Sector 
  Reinvestment Allowance  
  Accelerated Capital Allowance  
  Accelerated Capital Allowance on Equipment to Maintain Quality of Power Supply  
  Incentive for Industrialized Building System  
  Tax Exemption on the Value of Increased Exports  
  
Incentives for Research and Development 
  Contract R&D Company  
  R&D Company  36 
 
  In-house Research  
  Incentives for Commercialization of Public Sector R&D  
  Double Deduction for Research and Development  
  Incentives for Researchers to Commercialize Research Findings 
  
Incentives for Training 
  Incentives for Unemployed Graduate Training Scheme  
  Deduction for Pre-employment Training  
  Special Industrial Building Allowance  
  Tax Exemption on Educational Equipment  
  Double Deduction for Approved Training  
  Human Resource Development Fund 
  
Incentives for the use of Information and Communication Technology (ICT) 
  Accelerated Capital Allowance 
  Deduction of Operating Expenditure 
  Tax Exemption on the Value of Increased Exports 
 
Tariff Related Incentives 
  Exemption from Import Duty on Raw Materials/Components  
  Exemption from Import Duty and Sales Tax on Machinery and Equipment  
  Exemption from Import Duty and Sales Tax on Spares and Consumables  
  Exemption from Import Duty and Sales Tax for Outsourcing Manufacturing Activities  
  Exemption from Import Duty and Sales Tax for Maintenance, Repair and Overhaul (MRO) 
Activities  
  Exemption from Import Duty and Sales Tax on Energy Efficiency Equipment  
  Sales Tax Exemption  
  Drawback on Import Duty, Sales Tax and Excise Duty 37 
 
 
Incentives for Export 
  Single Deduction for the Promotion of Exports  
  Double Deduction for the Promotion of Exports  
  Double Deduction on Export Credit Insurance Premiums  
  Double Deduction on Freight Charges  
  Double Deduction for the Promotion of Malaysian Brand Names  
  Special Industrial Building Allowance for Warehouses  
 
 